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Institutional Religious Exemptions: A Balancing
Approach
I. INTRODUCTION
“Whether and when to exempt religious practices from
regulation is the most fundamental religious liberty issue in the
United States today.” 1 The debate concerning exemptions for
religious individuals from neutral, generally applicable laws is
longstanding, 2 and the debate over exemptions for church-affiliated
organizations and other religious institutions (“institutional
exemptions”) has gained increased media and legal attention in the
past few years. Controversy has escalated with the Supreme Court’s
formal recognition of a “ministerial exemption” to federal
antidiscrimination laws 3 and with a limited religious exemption to
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
contraceptive mandate. 4 Proponents of institutional exemptions
argue that exemptions are necessary to protect religious freedom and
autonomy; without them, the government unjustifiably intrudes into
the sphere of religion by regulating private behavior in ways that
jeopardize free exercise rights. 5 By protecting religious institutions’
right to self-governance, proponents argue, institutional exemptions
protect religious freedom for individuals. 6 Professor Mary Ann
Glendon, for example, opines that the HHS mandate “is a grave

1. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION
139, 145 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1514–15
(1979).
3. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
707 (2012).
4. The mandate, finalized and rendered effective in August 2013, requires employers
who offer health plans to “provide contraceptive coverage” but exempts “religious employers”
from this requirement. 45 C.F.R. 147.130.
5. See, e.g., Eileen P. Kelly & Thomas E. Kelly, A Retrospective on Public Policy Threats
to Religious Liberty in the Workplace, 17 CATH. SOC. SCI. REV. 241, 241–42 (2012) (arguing
that Catholic institutions have been increasingly under attack by generally applicable secular
law and public policy that contravenes Catholic morality).
6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009).
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violation of religious freedom” because it does not contain an
adequate religious exemption. 7
Critics of institutional exemptions, on the other hand, contend
that broad exemptions may unjustifiably authorize religious
organizations to violate civil rights laws. 8 Because religious groups
may sometimes “exert, on the individual, oppressive and coercive
power,” exemptions may undermine individuals’ rights by
sanctioning the institutions’ use of coercive power. 9 Some have
argued that institutional exemptions amount to undue preferential
treatment of religious organizations, which undermines the efficacy
of law. 10 Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks, for example, argues that
an overly broad exemption to the HHS mandate could subvert
important Constitutional values such as access to contraceptives. 11
Many believe that the ministerial exemption, 12 sanctioned in
Hosanna-Tabor, licenses church-affiliated institutions to engage in
harmful, discriminatory practices. 13

7. See, e.g., John Garvey et al., Unacceptable, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
(Apr.
11,
2012),
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/04/Unacceptable-4-11.pdf (arguing that the so-called religious exemption to the HHS
mandate “is an insult to the intelligence of Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other people of faith and conscience to imagine that they will
accept an assault on their religious liberty if only it is covered up by a cheap accounting trick”).
8. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in
Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2013).
9. Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1773, 1783.
10. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, With Religious Liberty for All: A Defense of the
Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Coverage Mandate, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Gedicks_-_With_Religious_
Liberty_for_All_1.pdf (“That religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional value is not in
doubt. Access to contraceptives is also a fundamental constitutional liberty.”).
12. “The ministerial exemption is a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception
to the application of employment-discrimination and civil rights statutes to religious
institutions and their ‘ministerial’ employees. The ministerial exemption . . . generally bars
inquiry into a religious institution’s underlying motivation for a contested employment
decision.” Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008).
13. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 405–06.
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Similar debates in the United States concerning religious
exemptions have thrived for more than two centuries, 14 and the heart
of the controversy is as old as civil society itself. The debate is rooted
in the question of how the secular state can permit religious groups
and individuals to “[r]ender . . . unto Caesar the things which be
Caesar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s” 15 when there is
disagreement as to which things are Caesar’s. This issue arises when
separationism fails 16—when the jurisdictional spheres of the church
and state are not distinct but rather overlap in conflicting ways. 17
Exemptions have generally offered a solution to the age-old dilemma
of how religious freedom and civil law can coexist in an ordered
society when secular law clashes with what religious believers
consider a higher moral law. 18
Institutional exemptions are unique, however, in their approach
to this dilemma. They draw boundaries between the church and state
domains, carving out areas that are categorically “off limits” for the
state regardless of their substantive content. Communal standards
are at issue rather than personal beliefs. Whereas individual
exemptions depend on proof of a person’s sincerely held religious
belief in a specific substantive issue, 19 institutional exemptions are
granted more broadly in order to protect a religious group’s right to
self-governance. 20 As Professor Perry Dane has observed, the right to

14. See, e.g., People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reported in WILLIAM
SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (New York 1813 and photo. reprint 1974)
(asking when a priest qualifies for a religious exemption).
15. Luke 20:25 (King James).
16. “Equal Liberty” is an exemption paradigm that thoroughly explores the failure of
separationism. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4, 51–77 (2007).
17. Professor Perry Dane has described this phenomenon in depth. Perry Dane, The
Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117
(Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307670.
18. As Professor Dane puts it, “[t]he most pregnant and emblematic problems in the
encounter of religion and the state, however, are, it seems to me, essentially jurisdictional.
They are about the nature of the boundaries between the realms of religion and secular law
and government, and the nature and degree of deference that each should expect of the
other.” Id. at 120.
19. Sincerity of belief has long been the test for conscientious objector qualification. See,
e.g., Welsh, II v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
20. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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an institutional exemption does not depend on an individual
“asserting a specific conflict between a secular legal norm and a
sincerely held religious belief. To the contrary, the right to
autonomy, correctly understood, attaches to a religious institution
regardless of its motives and beliefs.” 21 Institutional exemptions thus
fence the government out of whole fields of religious group activity.
For example, the ministerial exemption, recognized in HosannaTabor, shields many church-affiliated institutions from antidiscrimination laws regardless of the group’s religious stance
on discrimination. 22
Of course, the main difficulty in fencing out the government is
knowing where to place the stakes. U.S. law forbids the state from
imposing its own definitive boundaries on the religious sphere. 23 Yet
lines must be drawn. If too narrow a perimeter is drawn, the state
risks encroaching upon religious autonomy. 24 That is, a church may
lose its vital freedom of self-governance when the state determines
which activities are religious. Conversely, if the state defers too
broadly to a group’s definition of religion, the religious group might
become a law unto itself. The secular government may find itself
without authority to regulate religious institutions, even when the
institutional activities at issue are non-religious or undermine the
public interest.
Hence the dilemma: institutional exemptions may safeguard
religious group autonomy, thereby serving as a vehicle for individual
free exercise, 25 but they may also enable institutions to evade

21. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1734 [hereinafter
Dane, “Omalous”]. Professor Dane’s distinction between “exemption rights” and “autonomy
rights” is analogous to my distinction between “individual exemptions” and “institutional
exemptions.” Id.
22. The plurality’s closing remarks in Hosanna-Tabor are simply, “[t]he church must be
free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” implying that what is protected by the
ministerial exemption is religious group self-governance rather than sincerely held religious
belief in discrimination. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
23. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
24. See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr., The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs: A
Comparative View, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 722–24 (Gerhard
Robbers ed., 2001), available at http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/
files/Chapter%2033.%20Durham.pdf (arguing that religious autonomy is fundamental to free
exercise).
25. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Has Obama Waged a War on Religion?, NPR

418

DO NOT DELETE

415

4/14/2014 11:27 AM

Institutional Religious Exemptions

important public policy such as antidiscrimination laws, regardless of
whether free exercise is served. 26 It is not then surprising that
institutional exemptions have gained attention in modern society, as
governments and churches alike have expanded their reach into new
social domains. 27 Much legal scholarship is devoted to drawing
jurisdictional boundaries in healthcare, employment, civil rights, and
First Amendment law. 28 It is also not surprising that paradigms of
institutional exemptions are fairly ad hoc. Exemption literature tends
to focus on either broad constitutional concerns, overlooking the
distinction between institutional and individual exemptions, 29 or on
narrow institutional exemptions in a specific field. 30
This Comment expands religious group autonomy theory into a
paradigm for institutional exemptions that accounts for the civil
rights of individuals. It articulates a rough balancing test for
weighing the benefits of exemptions to institutions—namely, the
protection of religious group autonomy—against the costs to
individuals—particularly the diminution of personal autonomy and
other Fourteenth Amendment rights. This balancing test provides a

(Jan. 8, 2012, 6:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/08/144835720/has-obamawaged-a-war-on-religion (explaining the view that due to state regulation, “Americans’
religious liberties are under attack”).
26. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., Is Religion Above the Law?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2011, 9:00 PM), available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/isreligion-above-the-law (arguing that the ministerial exemption is unjustifiable).
27. As Professor Ira Lupu has noted, “[i]n contemporary America, the combination of
wide-ranging religious pluralism, extending far beyond Protestant Christianity, and the farreaching expansion of government has created many more occasions for conflict between
religious practice and government policy.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and
Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLIUPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1914
(2011).
28. See, e.g., Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1783 (2012); Georgia L. Holmes & Penny Herickhoff, The First Amendment and The
Ministerial Exemption: Federal Statutory Mandates, 28 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 989 (2012);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the Establishment
Clause?: The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious
Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-Employment
Taxes, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633 (2012); David E. Bernstein, Commentary, The 1964 Civil
Rights Act is Under Attack Today—from Within, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/1964-civil-rights-act-is-under-attack-todaywithin.
29. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16.
30. See id.
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principled method for conceptualizing institutional exemptions and
determining when they might be justified. 31
Part II describes the most fundamental benefits of institutional
exemptions, while Part III describes the costs. Part IV identifies
objective criteria for measuring the benefits and costs of institutional
exemptions in varying contexts. Part V attempts to sketch how these
objective criteria might apply in specific situations where the
justifiability of institutional exemptions has been questioned.
II. BENEFITS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS
A. Institutional Exemptions Protect Religious Group Autonomy
Institutional exemptions are conceptually buttressed by group
autonomy theory. 32 “Group autonomy” in this context refers to a
religious group’s right to self-governance. 33 It is the freedom of a
church or other religious institution to set its own agenda and
administer its own affairs. 34 It posits that religious liberty for groups
fosters religious liberty for individuals, and thus implies that
institutional exemptions are beneficial to individuals and society at
large. 35 A broad approach to autonomy would prohibit almost any

31. “Procedural fairness” is a common law notion that individuals should be protected
against arbitrary decisions and actions against them by groups. See, e.g., Palm Med. Grp., Inc.
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 274 (2008). I use the term loosely to describe
the evenhanded and logical constituency that both government and private groups owe
individuals when dealing with them.
32. In the words of Professor Perry Dane, “[w]e might even see institutional autonomy
as the conceptual kernel around which a defense of exemptions might be built.” Dane,
“Omalous,” supra note 21, at 1736.
33. See, e.g., id. at 1730–40; Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free
Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1635 (advocating that
individual free exercise flourishes when religious groups are free to manage their internal affairs
with minimal state oversight); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009); Richard W.
Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses,
53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?]; Richard W. Garnett,
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 515, 530–32 (2007) (suggesting that religious groups, as “First Amendment
institutions,” may deserve special protection from otherwise valid and generally applicable
laws); Horwitz, supra note 6, at 81 (arguing that churches deserve nearly absolute freedom
from government regulation); Laycock, supra note 1, at 145.
34. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 33.
35. See id.
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state interference with church affairs, regardless of its nature. 36 A
more moderate approach would permit the government to regulate
some religious activity if there is a compelling state interest. 37 Some
have also argued that the government should have power to apply
neutral principles of law in regulating procedural but not substantive
matters involving religious groups activity. 38
Regardless of the particular approach, group autonomy theory
fundamentally recognizes the unique nature of religious institutions
and their relation to religious individuals. Group autonomy theory is
born of the fact that a church qua church is not constitutionally
entitled to First Amendment protection but is an indispensible
component of free exercise. 39 Although group autonomy theory fails
to provide a complete answer to the institutional exemption
dilemma, it has dealt with difficult institutional problems in a way
that prevailing exemption paradigms have not. 40 Specifically, it
provides two main justifications for institutional exemptions: (1)

36. Professor Horowitz, for example, argues that the state has limited jurisdictional
power to intervene in church affairs and that churches can be trusted to self-regulate. He
proffers a “sphere sovereignty” theory, which severely constrains government power over
religious affairs to instances of abuse against church members. See Horwitz, supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On “Due Process
of Lawmaking” and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1035 (1994).
38. Professor Evans explains that a “procedural fairness” approach to religious
exemptions empowers courts to regulate religious activity only when it is procedurally unfair to
an individual. CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA: LEGAL PROTECTION OF
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (2011). This protects religious autonomy while protecting
individuals against arbitrary abuse of power by churches. The European Court of Human
Rights utilized this approach when it affirmed the LDS Church’s decision to fire its public
affairs director for having an extra-marital affair. The court did not adjudicate the merits of
firing the employee, rather it determined simply that the church had dealt fairly with
employees by giving them notice of religious employment standards. See Obst v. Germany,
425/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/engpress/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3272505-3650095.
39. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About Hybrid Rights and Religious
Groups, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PT. 192 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-lawjournal-pocket-part/civil-rights/three-questions-about-hybrid-rights-and-religious-groups/
(noting widespread agreement that group rights are constitutionally suspect).
40. Some predominant exemption theories, for example Equal Liberty, implicitly
presume that religious institutions and groups stand on equal Constitutional footing. Equal
Liberty’s inability to account for the difference between institutional and individual religious
freedom is manifest by its superficial and limited explanation of why the Boy Scouts of America
are entitled freedom of association. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16. Group autonomy
advocates, on the other hand, do not generally conflate issues of group and individual religious
rights.
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religious autonomy is a vehicle for free exercise, and (2) religious
autonomy fosters healthy pluralism in democratic society. 41
1. Religious autonomy is a vehicle for free exercise
Institutional exemptions may be necessary to protect free exercise
rights because personal religious freedom is often exercised via group
activity. 42 People worship in groups. Religious individuals have deep
and complex relationships with religious groups. 43 Individuals find
strength in numbers and band together to form religious institutions
that enable them to collectively advance “the kingdom of God.” 44
Moreover, religious institutions, such as churches and schools,
transmit religious beliefs to individuals. Such institutions help
develop doctrine, create traditions, preserve beliefs, and advance
ideas. In other words, “[t]he freedom of religion is not only lived
and experienced through institutions, it is also protected and
nourished by them.” 45 As Professor Cole Durham has explained:
[I]ndividual freedom of religion would be impoverished if the
autonomy of religious organizations were left unprotected.
Religious communities protect the seedbeds of religious thought
and belief. They provide the environment within which religious
ideas and experience can be formed, crystallized, developed,
transmitted, and preserved. Individual belief would lack its richness,
its connectedness, and much of its character-building and meaninggiving power if it were cut off from the extended life of religious
communities. 46

41. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 6.
42. See, e.g., DURHAM, W. COLE, & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION:
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2010) (explaining the
popular view that religious group autonomy is crucial to the protection of free exercise rights
because individuals utilize groups to exercise religious belief).
43. Id.
44. Brady, supra note 33, at 1705. Professor Laycock has also made this argument,
noting that “[t]here can be no coherent understanding of religious liberty without the right to
actually practice your religion. When the state says, ‘You can believe whatever you want but
you can never act on it,’ that is not religious liberty, and it is certainly not the free exercise of
religion. ‘Exercise,’ now and in the Founders’ time, means actions and conduct.” Laycock,
supra note 1, at 149.
45. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33, at 291–93.
46. Durham, supra note 24; see also Brady, supra note 33, at 1677 (“Full freedom of
belief is not possible without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop, and
practice their doctrines and ideas.”).
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Laws that limit institutional autonomy—including general and
neutral laws without religious exemptions—may end up limiting
personal religious freedom. Unless churches are ensured an adequate
legal right “to be left alone,” 47 secular antidiscrimination ordinances
and other laws will be able to coerce religious institutions into giving
up traditional beliefs and conforming to contemporary social
norms. 48 When the state pigeonholes religious groups into secular
organizational structures, religious institutions lose power to
preserve traditional religious orders. 49 Ecclesiastic leaders and other
members of the group are forced “to behave according to . . . the
standards that attach to those [secular] labels.” 50 Individuals within
the church may become unable to continue time-honored worship
practices. For example, courts resolving sexual abuse claims against
the Catholic Church might jeopardize traditional Catholic clericalism
by pigeonholing ecclesiastical leaders into tort categories. 51 Few
people disagree that the church should face legal repercussions for its
clergy’s sexual misconduct, but attempts to describe the relationship
between bishop and priest in terms of respondeat superior may
jeopardize the freedom of bishops and priests to define their own
relationships. A more generalized legal rubric of duties specially
adapted to the church’s clerical order may better preserve autonomy
and safeguard free exercise. 52
2. Religious autonomy advances democratic goals
Institutional exemptions may also be socially desirable, according
to some proponents, because democratic society flourishes when
state regulation of religion is minimized. 53 Religious institutions
advance the goals of a democratic society by contributing diverse
viewpoints to the democratic experience. Religious groups are
“training grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and

47. Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1372, 1376 (1981).
48. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 6, at 119 (arguing that without a ministerial
exemption, for example, secular antidiscrimination ordinances in employment law would
penalize religions for not conforming to secular norms).
49. Id.; Brady, supra note 33.
50. Dane, “Omalous” supra note 21, at 1715.
51. Id.; see also Horwitz, supra note 6.
52. See Horwitz, supra note 6.
53. Brady, supra note 33; see Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33.
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responsibilities, they are schools for democracy.” 54 The American
political process is thus enriched as religious individuals band
together in groups to develop their beliefs and contribute to the
democratic process.
Churches also provide a sociocultural counterpoint to secularism,
thereby “protecting alternate visions of social and political life” in a
pluralist society. 55 Like other First Amendment institutions, religious
groups provide infrastructural support for First Amendment
freedom. 56 By giving religious individuals a collective voice, religious
groups protect individuals against the state’s oppressive power and
make free exercise possible. Thus, “religious institutions—healthy,
independent, free, diverse institutions—are themselves among the
necessary conditions for religious freedom.” 57
III. COSTS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS
“‘Autonomy’ is only the label we attach to one side of a
necessarily two-sided encounter between normative worlds.” 58
Group autonomy theory merely highlights the benefits of
institutional exemptions, namely the protection of religious group
freedom and the systemic advancement of free exercise. 59 These
benefits must be weighed against their costs, namely the social costs
of letting groups disregard the rules. Although institutional
exemptions may advance free exercise in some instances, they can, in
other instances, subvert the individual’s civil rights—especially in
matters where individuals are vulnerable to oppression by groups. In
healthcare, employment, and civil rights law especially, exemptions
from important safeguards against the mistreatment of individuals
are likely to impose direct burdens on individuals. 60 The autonomy
54. Brady, supra note 33, at 1700–01.
55. Id. at 1667.
56. See Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 33.
57. Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and (and in) Institutions (Notre Dame
Legal Studies Paper No. 12-57), in CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE TWENTYFIRST
CENTURY
71
(Gerard
V.
Bradley
ed.,
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027639.
58. Dane, supra note 17, at 147.
59. Professor Underkuffler has also observed the “tendency, by those who advocate
religious-group autonomy, to focus on the needs of the target group and its members”
without considering the needs of complainants. Underkuffler, supra note 9, at 1784.
60. Professors Lupu and Tuttle have argued that a fair balancing of rights in the
exemption dilemma context will consider who bears the cost of the exemption, that is whether

424

DO NOT DELETE

415

4/14/2014 11:27 AM

Institutional Religious Exemptions

justifications for exemptions are weakened in these cases, when
groups inhibit individuals’ rights to due process and equal
protection. Exemptions also insulate religious institutions from
liability for misconduct, religiously motivated or not. 61 Exemptions
can immunize groups from antidiscrimination laws, education
standards, workplace safety rules, commercial dealings provisions,
and anticorruption laws, which are all designed to protect individuals
from abuses of power by groups. 62
A. Group Autonomy Can Hamper Individual Rights
Institutional exemptions often sacrifice individual rights to
religious autonomy. 63 In resolving perceived conflicts between
secular and religious norms, exemptions can undermine the state’s
ability to resolve conflicts between religious institutions and
individuals. Exemptions can give religious groups freedom to
trample judicially recognized Fourteenth Amendment rights,
including the right to self-determination in healthcare matters 64 and
to equal protection in employment law. 65 The root of this
phenomenon is what Professor Gedicks has called “the recurring
paradox of groups.” 66 The paradox is this: “[W]hile groups buffer
their members from oppressive government action, they also buffer
them from liberating government action.” 67 That is, religious groups
society at large can absorb the cost of exemption or whether it is concentrated on a smaller set
of individuals. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 27.
61. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal
State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47 (arguing that too much religious autonomy can negatively shield
religious groups from liberal influences).
62. Professor Underkuffler argues that if religious groups and institutions are granted
unbridled autonomy, they can disregard an endless list of socially necessary laws. Underkuffler,
supra note 9, at 1784–85.
63. Although not really a paradigm for institutions exemptions per se, Professor
Underkuffler’s criticism of religious autonomy is fundamental to exemption theory. See id.
64. The Supreme Court has long upheld the constitutional principle that “[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept.
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
65. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
66. Gedicks, supra note 61, at 47.
67. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 418 (“When government intervention in group matters
would enhance individual autonomy, as in the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, group
rights that block such intervention subvert individual autonomy.”).
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can be vehicles for free exercise as well as shelters for intolerance. 68
When group and individual interests are at odds, institutional
exemptions may simultaneously subvert personal autonomy and
protect group autonomy.
At least one poignant example of how this paradox can play out
involves “conscience clauses” exempting church-affiliated healthcare
providers from providing emergency contraceptive and abortion
services. 69 While the clauses have obvious church autonomy
justifications, the following narrative demonstrates how even
seemingly justifiable institutional exemptions in healthcare law might
subvert patient autonomy:
[Kathleen] Prieskorn was three months pregnant and working as a
waitress when she felt a twinge, felt a trickle down her leg and
realized she was miscarrying again.
She rushed to her doctor’s office, where [she] learned [her]
amniotic sac had torn, . . . But the nearest hospital had recently
merged with a Catholic hospital—and because [her] doctor could
still detect a fetal heartbeat, he wasn’t allowed to give [her] a
uterine evacuation that would help [her] complete [the]
miscarriage.
To get treatment, Prieskorn, who has no car, had to instead travel
80 miles to the nearest hospital that would perform the
procedure—expensive to do in an ambulance, because she had no
health insurance. Her doctor handed her $400 of his own cash and
she bundled into the back of a cab. 70

68. See id.
69. A majority of states of have enacted statutes expressly immunizing healthcare
providers from civil liability for withholding, on religious grounds, certain types of medical
attention from patients. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 1791 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12142 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443
(West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (LexisNexis 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.31 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009);
MINN. STAT. § 145.42(1) (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(1) (West 2004); MONT. CODE
ANN. §50-20-111 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3 (West 2010); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-i(2) (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-23A-12 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306(1) (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 253.09 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-106 (2013).
70. Molly M. Ginty, Treatment Denied, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (May 9, 2011),
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/05/09/treatment-denied/ (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Kathleen not only incurred unnecessary physical risks due to a
delay in care, 71 but also incurred substantial medical costs when
institutional standards overshadowed her right as a patient to selfdetermination. Troublingly, this is not an isolated example of
religious group practices swallowing up patient autonomy in
healthcare law. 72 The National Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”) has
observed that many women have had similar experiences with lifethreatening pregnancies at church-affiliated hospitals. 73 In a
comprehensive study of how Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals
treat ectopic pregnancies and dangerous miscarriages, the NWLC
and Ibis Reproductive Health found that many religious healthcare
institutions routinely fail to meet the governmentally prescribed
standard of care. 74 Both common law and the Federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act require healthcare providers to
offer prompt emergency care for patients, such as hemorrhaging
women, who face “material deterioration of their condition” if care

71. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Diagnose a Pregnancy § 2
(2013) (describing the potentially disastrous consequences of medical negligence when a
woman is miscarrying).
72. See Stephane P. Fabus, Religious Refusal: Endangering Pregnant women and
Professional Standards, 13 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 219 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=elders;
Tricia K. Fujikawa Lee, Emergency Contraception in Religious Hospitals: The Struggle Between
Religious Freedom and Personal Autonomy, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 65 (2004); Katherine A.
White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’
Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703 (1999).
73. The National Women’s Law Center initiated a study that was conducted by Ibis
Reproductive Health, a clinical and social science research organization. Ibis selected a
sampling of geographically diverse Catholic, non-Catholic and recently merged hospitals.
Researchers conducted in-depth phone interviews with doctors, asking about their knowledge
of hospital policies and practices regarding the treatment of ectopic pregnancies and
miscarriages, as well as their perceptions of how these policies affected their treatment decisions
and the quality of patient care. NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENT., BELOW THE RADAR: RELIGIOUS
REFUSALS TO TREAT PREGNANCY COMPLICATIONS PUT WOMEN IN DANGER (2012)
[hereinafter NWLC REPORT].
74. The report explains that many doctors interpret the church’s Directives to prohibit
medically induced abortion of life-threatening pregnancies. Thus, they feel religiously
obligated and entitled to withhold emergency medical care. Id. at 2–4; see also ANGEL M.
FOSTER ET AL., ASSESSING HOSPITAL POLICIES & PRACTICES REGARDING ECTOPIC
PREGNANCY & MISCARRIAGE MANAGEMENT: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL QUALITATIVE STUDY
(Ibis Reprod. Health, 2009), available at http://www.ibisreproductivehealth.org/news/
documents/Summaryofqualitativestudy.pdf.
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is delayed. 75 Yet many Catholic hospitals feel that the church-issued
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services
entitle them to withhold prompt emergency care from women who
face tubal rupture or other serious complications. 76 Whether or not
conscience clauses or other institutional exemptions are actually
involved, religious institutions often feel morally entitled to violate
secular law in order to serve a higher law. Patients, in turn, often lack
recourse because they do not know the legal standard of care and do
not know to challenge their providers’ judgment. 77
Clearly, therefore, religious groups can harm individuals. But it is
also true that many non-religious groups treat individuals badly, and
subversion of individual rights may merely be an inherent risk of
institutional groupthink. 78 Religious groups in this regard may be
viewed no differently than any other group. A church-owned
hospital’s negligent treatment of dangerous pregnancies may be
attributed to America’s healthcare system problems generally. One
might consider the religious school in Hosanna-Tabor as “neither a
church fighting to defend the integrity of its doctrine nor a school
whose leaders gave vent to a legally prohibited prejudice, but a
group of ordinary people dealing with the messiness of real life.” 79 A
conflict between a religious employer and an employee concerning
discrimination in the workplace may be chalked up as just another
Title VII feud. A religious commercial vendor’s indelicate habit of
refusing service to customers with certain sexual proclivities may be
considered foreseeable backlash against state attempts to regulate
free enterprise.

75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006); see also George v. Travelers Ins. Co. (E.D. La.) 215 F.
Supp. 340, aff’d, 328 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1964); 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s
Failure to Diagnose a Pregnancy § 2 (2013).
76. “For example, a Catholic hospital refused to provide the uterine evacuation
necessary to stabilize a patient having a miscarriage, saying that it would only give her blood
transfusions as long as there was still a fetal heartbeat. A doctor at a non-sectarian hospital
finally agreed to accept the transfer of the patient, despite the doctor’s concern that the patient
was unstable.” NWLC REPORT, supra note 73, at 2.
77. NWLC REPORT, supra note 73, at 2 (explaining that women are often unable to
bring claims against their doctors).
78. Social psychologists often refer to “groupthink” as the set of problems “that can
arise when people with particular worldviews retreat into the safe haven offered by the
company of those with whom they always agree.” RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF RELIGION VOL. 23, ix (Ralph L. Piedmont & Andrew Village eds., 2012).
79. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 415.
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In other words, individuals may be harmed equally by secular
and religious groups alike. Sometimes the very nature of groups,
rather than a group’s religious affiliation, accounts for the
mistreatment of individuals by both secular and religious institutions.
The difference, however, is the religious group’s ability to rely on its
religious status to evade the consequences of the law. Whereas courts
are allowed to scrupulously analyze the mistakes of tortfeasors in
ordinary discrimination or malpractice situations, institutional
exemptions preclude judicial inquiry into the wrongdoing of
religious groups in certain areas of law. 80 Because institutional
exemptions necessarily delineate whole fields of litigation that are off
limits for courts, they enable religious groups to evade liability for
wrongdoing by simply raising a religious group autonomy defense.
This evasion is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it
implies that exemptions may actually perpetuate systemic
mistreatment of individuals by religious groups. Classic tort theory
implies that unless religious institutions are held liable for their
wrongdoings, they will lack incentive to comply with contemporary
social and medical standards. 81 Second, such non-compliance is
unjustifiable in situations where the wrongdoing stems from
religious social norms or mere groupthink rather than actual
religious conviction. 82 The purpose of institutional exemptions is to
advance free exercise through the vehicle of group rights. Yet this
purpose is not served when an institution’s actions are not
80. For example, courts have broadly declined to adjudicate wrongful termination suits
filed against religious employers. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d
169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir.
2006); Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
81. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (describing tort law as a tool for promoting efficient
behavior).
82. The distinction between groupthink and actual religious conviction is nuanced but
reveals how “the answers to the question ‘when and why is religion good or bad for the
individual’ vary across context.” Alana Conner Snibbe & Hazel Rose Markus, The Psychology of
Religion and the Religion of Psychology, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 3, 229 (2002).
Groupthink is “likely to occur when a group: (a) collectively evaluates and rationalizes the
decisions it makes, (b) promotes uniformity of ideas, (c) assumes a censorship role toward
outside views, and (d) exclusively selects information that supports their perspectives.” Kari
O’Grady & Richard York, Theism and Non-Theism in Psychological Science: Towards Scholarly
Dialogue, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION VOL. 23, 286 (Ralph
L. Piedmont & Andrew Village eds., 2012) (internal citations omitted). Religious conviction,
on the other hand, involves introspective formulation of personal views coupled with group
dialogue. See id.
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attributable to sincerely held religious belief. 83 Nor is free exercise
necessarily advanced when a religious group fails to respect the
personal beliefs of its individual constituents. 84 For example, a
Catholic hospital may theologically disagree with its Catholic
employee’s belief that God permits abortion when the mother’s life
is jeopardized. 85 The employee’s freedom to exercise this religious
belief, by aborting a life-threatening pregnancy, is limited if the
hospital enjoys an absolute right to limit the employee’s otherwise
legally appropriate actions.
IV. THE BALANCING TEST
Once the true costs and benefits of institutional exemptions are
identified, the more difficult question is how to objectively measure
them. Exemptions cover so much legal ground that ad hoc costbenefit analyses may seem preferable to a universal balancing test. 86
The balancing act is particularly difficult because each side of the
scale holds penumbral rights. On the benefits side of the scale, group
rights stand on tenuous Constitutional grounds. 87 The right to
religious group autonomy is merely implied by a hodgepodge of
Supreme Court cases. 88 Nor, on the costs side, does the text of the
Constitution expressly guarantee an individual’s right to patient
autonomy or freedom from discrimination. 89 Therefore, the weight
afforded to each side of the scale can be difficult to determine. The

83. In Hosanna-Tabor, for example, the church lacked any sincerely held theological
justification for firing an employee with a medical condition. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm., 132 U.S. 694 (2012).
84. Professor Underkuffler has further developed this point. See Underkuffler, supra
note 9.
85. Sister Margaret McBride, devout Catholic and hospital administrator at a Catholic
hospital, allowed hospital personnel to abort a pregnancy in 2009 when a woman came into
the emergency room in critical condition. She was severely reprimanded and excommunicated
from the church. See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Nun Excommunicated for Allowing Abortion,
NPR (May 19, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126985072.
86. EVANS, supra note 38; Brady, supra note 33.
87. “American constitutional rights doctrine is relentlessly individualistic. . . . To the
limited extent that constitutional doctrine protects group rights, it does so only because such
protection promotes individual liberty. Second-order group rights exist only to protect firstorder individual rights.” Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
88. Gedicks, supra note 39.
89. Many textualists especially have challenged Fourteenth Amendment–derived rights
as constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., Joan R. Bullock, Abortion Rights in America, 1994 BYU
L. REV. 63.
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actual costs and benefits of exemptions can also vary widely in
different contexts. Nevertheless, some objective indicators of
personal costs and group benefits can be considered in order to
achieve procedurally fair results.
A. Measuring Group Autonomy Benefits
Again, the core justification for institutional exemptions is that
they advance free exercise by protecting religious group autonomy.
On the benefits side of the scale then, lawmakers should measure the
degree to which an exemption actually serves free exercise through
its protection of group autonomy. Lawmakers are constitutionally
prohibited from arbitrarily defining what substantively constitutes
“important” religious activity “deserving” of exemption 90—the
reason being that a religious institution may legitimately consider
“even the most mundane and routine” aspects of its affairs religiously
significant. 91 There is, however, no constitutional prohibition on
objectively observing institutional behavior from the outside. The
state may look at a group’s actions to determine whether that group
has positioned itself in society as a self-contained vehicle for free
exercise. The government may observe from the sidelines whether a
group chooses to involve itself in public affairs or chooses instead to
interact with only an exclusive set of religious group members. The
state may observe objective indicia of self-containment in order to
distinguish highly public religious institutions from more
private ones.
That is, by evaluating the religious exclusivity of various
religiously affiliated institutions, the state can objectively distinguish
entities that highly value religious autonomy from entities willing to
subject themselves to more scrutiny from outsiders. To measure
religious exclusivity, the state can observe (a) the religious group’s

90. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212
(1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–11, 15–16 (1947).
91. Professor Brady has conducted further constitutional analysis to make this point and
concluded that “the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious groups to
preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free from government interference is a broad right
of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church affairs.” Brady, supra note 33, at
1698.
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acceptance of state aid, 92 and (b) whether the institution chooses to
provide services to the community at large instead of some smaller
religious subset. Table 1 helps describe the notion that different
types of religious institutions have different degrees of religious
exclusivity. A religious institution may fit anywhere on the spectrum
below, depending on how it chooses to interact with its community
and the state.
Underlying this spectrum of religious exclusivity is the “crucial
distinction between public and private realms.” 93 Public institutions
provide socially important goods and services, including commercial
goods and services, directly to both religious and non-religious
individuals. 94 They are very inclusive, opening doors to the general
92. This formula leaves open the question of whether tax exemptions are considered
state aid and how that might affect determinations of how much an institution is benefiting
from the government, but that is beyond the scope of this Comment. For now, the focus is
when the institution is affirmatively getting something from the state.
93. Professor Lupu has argued that “the crucial distinction between public and private
realms” helps discern procedurally fair religious exemptions from unfair ones. The distinction
“reflects widely shared and legally embodied beliefs about the exercise of authority by
individuals, intermediate associations, and state institutions.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 280–82
(2010).
94. The recognition of “public institutions” in American jurisprudence dates back to the
Early National Era. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (recognizing the right of the
federal government to create a national bank in order to fulfill public purposes); see also Van
Reed v. People’s Nat’l Bank of Lebanon, 198 U.S. 554, 557 (1905) (recognizing private
banks as quasi-public institutions). While U.S. courts have formulated various tests for
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public and often accepting state aid to finance their services. 95 The
more a religious group chooses to behave like a completely public
institution, the more it enmeshes itself with the secular world and
relinquishes some actual power to set its own agenda. It forgoes life
on an island in order to interact with outsiders. It invites the public
into its sphere. 96 Private institutions generally do not serve the public
at large but rather serve the interests of a selective, exclusive set of
individuals. A truly private institution is self-sustaining, thriving
without government aid or interaction with outsiders. The more a
religious group behaves like a private institution, by choosing to
keep out of the public sphere, the more it secludes itself from the
secular world and maintains actual power of self-governance. 97
Conversely, the more a religious group acts as a public institution,
the more it should be subjected to society’s general laws. As a
positive matter, many religious institutions are semi-public or semiprivate.
By objectively evaluating a group’s religious exclusivity,
lawmakers may describe positive differences between various types of
religious institutions without substantively limiting the definition of
“religion.” As they recognize and identify the objective factors that
distinguish a church qua church from a church-owned megamall,
lawmakers become capable of employing a procedurally fair
balancing test. Professor Laycock has explained:

identifying public institutions, see, for example, Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). I
use “public institution” in a broad sense, as a reference to an entity that provides goods or
services to all members of society at large. Thus there are varying degrees of publicness, and I
adopt the understanding expressed by Mark Chopko: “Borrowing from a sociological notion
of public institutions, there are certain organizing or mediating structures—government,
religious organizations, private charities, the military, and similar organizations—that have
socializing roles, internal governance and ritual, and other factors that set them apart from the
rest of society. These so-called ‘public institutions’ all serve one or another important purpose
for society. The importance of these institutions is that they interact with one another to create
an equilibrium among socializing agents.” Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public
Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 661–62 (1992) (internal
citations omitted).
95. Chopko, supra note 94.
96. In other words, “[t]he distinction between public and private focuses on the scope
of invitation and the character of the use.” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 93, at 283.
97. Groups and individuals forgo some actual power upon becoming involved in society
because society itself is a larger group that exerts domineering power over its constituents. It is
not simply the presence of general and neutral law that causes people and groups to conform.
Rather, the existential human condition requires groups and individuals to follow certain
norms in order to fit into society.
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The text of the Constitution applies to all forms of religious
practice, central or peripheral. Still, the argument against
oppression is strongest with respect to the most important religious
practices, and weaker with respect to marginal practices that
believers might be willing to give up. But the importance of
religious practices varies from person to person, and is difficult for
courts to assess. 98

That is, the difference between a church and a church-owned
commercial megamall seems intuitively obvious but difficult to
describe without simply declaring that a megamall is less “religious”
than a church. The religious exclusivity approach helps ameliorate this
difficulty by respecting both church autonomy and its limits. It leaves
room for groups to control the degree of autonomy to which they
are entitled.
If, for example, a church-affiliated adoption agency feels
threatened by antidiscrimination laws and desires total autonomy to
discriminate against homosexual couples, it can always stop accepting
state funding and hold itself out as an exclusive religious group that
serves church members only. 99 An objective focus on religious
exclusivity also helps lawmakers and scholars identify areas where
religious externalities will likely arise. The more non-religious
individuals are served by or work for an institution, the more likely
non-members will incur direct and unique burdens. In other words
the more inclusive and public the institution, the less entitled it is to
an exemption because it has deliberately relinquished some actual
(not just legal) power of self-governance. The group is behaving less
like a vehicle for individual free exercise and more like a charity group.
B. Measuring Group Autonomy Costs
The most direct cost of institutional exemptions is their toll on
individual free exercise and due process rights. Individual rights to

98. Laycock, supra note 1, at 151.
99. A religious exemption for such an agency still may not be justified, as discussed
below, if non-religious individuals have no market alternatives for adoption. I also recognize
the theoretical risk here that public institutions will flee the market, leaving a gap in the public
services sector. But the governing principle in my paradigm is that churches must make
themselves autonomous if they want the benefits of autonomy. They cannot have their cake
and eat it too. If a group refuses to recognize restrictive state power in certain realms of group
activity, the group should not be allowed to cherry pick the fruits of liberating state power
either. Professor Lupu has recognized this principle. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 27.
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personal autonomy, equal access, and equal opportunity are all
threatened by group dominance. On the costs side of the scale, then,
lawmakers must evaluate the degree to which an exemption
jeopardizes personal autonomy; because risks to personal autonomy
and other individual rights can be mitigated by voluntary, knowing
consent, 100 lawmakers must consider the voluntariness of an
individual’s interaction with the religious group. If an individual has
total control over his or her involvement with a religious group, the
potential cost of oppression is minimized because the individual is
empowered to leave the group. State regulation may be unnecessary,
and exemptions may be granted more liberally, when interactions
between the individual and group are knowing and consensual. Key
indicators of voluntariness, or an individual’s control and consent,
are (a) information symmetry 101 and (b) access to alternative
institutions in the market. The more an individual is coerced into
dealing with a group, the more state regulation may be necessary.
Interactions with groups can thus be described along a spectrum of
voluntariness as described in Table 2.

100. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1986).
101. Economists frequently refer to “information asymmetry,” or “imperfect
information,” as a phenomenon wherein “the managers of the firm know more about the firm
than the market.” Nathalie Dierkens, Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues, 26 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 181, 182 (1991). Qualitative economic research has long indicated
that information asymmetry makes individual participants in a market “worse off” than they
would be in a market without information symmetry. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629, 638 (1976).
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Lawmakers must ask whether individuals know about the
religious institution’s practices and can willfully choose that
institution over others. Individuals are less likely to be coerced by
group power, and costs of institutional exemptions are more likely to
be minimized, when groups are forthcoming about institutional
norms and standards. 102 When a church terminates an employee for
moral misconduct such as adultery, for example, the employee might
have a strong claim that her equal protection rights were violated if
the church’s action was arbitrary and not forewarned. The
employee’s claim will be weaker if she was fully informed of and
consented to the employer’s specific policy regarding adultery upon
being hired. The nature of the employee’s position in the company
and ability to seek alternate employment is also an important
consideration. Individual autonomy is likely to be diminished when
102. Professor Lupu recognizes this in the context of religious exemptions from
antidiscrimination ordinances protecting gay families. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 93.
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market alternatives are limited. The cost of exemptions will be high,
and the individual’s interaction with the group involuntary, when an
individual is physically or economically compelled to seek public
services from one particular religious group. A pregnant woman’s
interactions with a church-owned hospital, for example, may be fairly
involuntary—and the cost of healthcare exemptions high—when she
is hemorrhaging and financially or geographically unable to engage
another emergency healthcare provider.
V. INTERACTING VARIABLES
A brief analysis of some specific institutional exemptions may
illustrate how the above-described costs and benefits come together
in a balancing test. Table 3 visually describes how group autonomy
considerations overlay personal autonomy considerations.
Cases where the costs of exemptions are high and the benefits
low, or vice versa, seem fairly straightforward to resolve. Assuming
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one can determine both group exclusivity and how voluntary an
individuals’ encounter with that group is, 103 public policy will favor
exemptions when benefits outweigh costs. An example of the former
scenario is where churches seek exemption from state law requiring
general recognition of same-sex marriage. A statutory exemption in
Connecticut, for example, provides “[n]o church or qualified
church-controlled organization . . . shall be required to participate in
a ceremony solemnizing a marriage in violation of the religious
beliefs
of
that
church
or
qualified
church-controlled
organization.” 104 Setting aside the question of what constitutes a
qualified church-controlled organization under Connecticut law, the
exemption targets the church qua church. Religious autonomy
justifications for the exemption are high because a church is a highly
exclusive sort of religious group. Personal autonomy costs of the
exemption are probably low because the individuals affected by the
exemption can find other groups to solemnize their marriage and are
probably well aware that some churches may choose not to
solemnize same-sex marriages.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius provides a counterexample
where a privately held corporation sought religious exemption from
a health insurance provision mandate. 105 The costs of the exemption
outweigh the benefits. Hobby Lobby alleged that unless it was
exempted from the HHS contraceptive mandate it would “be
required, contrary to the [store owners’] religious beliefs, to provide
insurance coverage for certain drugs and devices that the applicants
believe can cause abortions.” 106 Religious group autonomy
justifications for the exemption are weak because the exemption
benefits a very inclusive commercial institution that opens its doors
to the public. The institution itself serves customers in more than
five hundred commercial retail stores nationwide, 107 and it has not
held itself out as a members-only group. Costs of the exemption are
high because individuals have limited control over their relationships
with employers. Individuals are, in a sense, coerced into interacting
103. See supra Part II.
104. An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of
the State for Same Sex Couples, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 09-13, § 7(a)–(b), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm.
105. 133 S. Ct. 641, 642 (2012).
106. Id. at 642.
107. Id. at 642.
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with their employer—especially in matters of healthcare benefits—
because they have limited alternative means of obtaining health
insurance. Moreover, the court record did not indicate that Hobby
Lobby employees were expressly informed of the institution’s
religious objections to underwriting certain employee insurance
policies; 108 employees thus cannot have consented to the idea that by
working for a Christian boss they might be denied possible HHSmandated healthcare benefits. 109 The cost-benefits balancing test
thus disfavors a religious exemption for Hobby Lobby and other
commercial businesses from the HHS contraceptive mandate.
Somewhat more difficult to parse are scenarios involving equally
high or equally low costs and benefits of exemptions. In these cases,
determinations of exclusivity and voluntariness may seem somewhat
less objective. Nevertheless, the balancing test may still prove useful
in difficult employment and healthcare cases.
A. The Employment Cases
Consider the scenario in Hosanna-Tabor. A teacher at a churchowned school was fired for “insubordination and disruptive
behavior,” uncannily at the same time she was diagnosed with
narcolepsy and had taken disability leave. Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church owned and operated a K–8 Lutheran
school that routinely hired “lay” teachers to teach secular subjects
and hired “called” teachers to teach religious subjects and perform
other pastoral functions. 110 As in the Hobby Lobby case, the toll of
an exemption on personal autonomy seems high because the affected
employee is vulnerable to her employer’s actions. The affected
individual here lacks control over her relationship with the group
because she is somewhat economically powerless to simply find a
replacement employer in the market. Indeed, the very fact that she
108. Id. at 642. In fact, Hobby Lobby’s sudden desire to withhold certain healthcare
benefits might have appeared arbitrary to employees. The company never denied that it “has
no moral objection to the use of preventive contraceptives and will continue its longstanding
practice of covering these preventive contraceptives for its employees,” but began objecting to
mandatory coverage of other contraceptives after the HHS mandate was passed. See Case
Synopsis of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hobbylobby.
109. See Case Synopsis of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hobbylobby.
110. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d
881 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
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brought suit and fought for her job indicates that she lacks control.
The employee also lacks the protection of forewarning. The religious
group failed to give employees advance notice of any intent, power,
or authority to disregard ADA provisions that employees ordinarily
and reasonably expect employers in society to follow. 111
Although the Court held the employer’s actions permissible
under a judicially enacted “ministerial exception,” 112 the balancing
test implies that the costs of the employer’s actions outweigh the
benefits in this scenario. The employee has a fairly low degree of
voluntariness or control over her relationship with the school. The
costs of a ministerial exemption are high. At the same time, the
benefits of a ministerial exemption are high. Church-owned schools
can be very exclusive and private. It is not clear whether the
Hosanna-Tabor school served a broad group of students in the
community or received public aid, and more information is necessary
in a close call like this to make an evaluation about public policy. The
church did at least hire some non-religious individuals and thereby
decreased its exclusivity somewhat. It also held itself out to the
public as a group that is, in at least some ways, a secular
institution. 113 Barring more information, the balancing test thus
implies that Hosanna-Tabor Court probably should not have excused
the employer’s conduct under a religious exemption.
Conversely, exemptions to employment laws may sometimes be
fair when church employees are fired for violating the church’s code
of moral conduct in their personal lives. 114 Consider the Mormon
Public Affairs official who was fired for having an extramarital
affair. 115 The group involved here is a church itself, an extremely
private and autonomous religious institution, so justifications for an
exemption are high. The individual is vulnerable to some coercion
and unable to control his relationship with his employer because of
the hierarchical nature of employer-employee relationships. Yet the
111. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
782 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the school’s personnel manual actually implied that
teachers would enjoy ordinary ADA protections).
112. The ministerial exception “bar[s] certain employment against religious institutions”
and is “rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.” Hosanna-Tabor,
133 S. Ct. at 644.
113. Id.
114. Obst v. Germany, 425/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3272505-3650095.
115. Id. at 2.
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employee was fully informed before the incident that he could lose
his job over moral infractions. 116 The individual thus had a fair
degree of control over his relationship with the church, so churchgroup considerations edge out individual ones. Because church
exclusivity is at its highest possible level while there is complete
information symmetry on the individual’s side of the scale, the
proposed balancing test indicates that the church should win the
fight for an exemption.
B. The Healthcare Cases
Healthcare scenarios also reveal the merits of the balancing test.
Kathleen Prieskorn had a miscarriage and rushed to the nearest
hospital, which happened to be a Catholic hospital. 117 The doctor at
the hospital determined that Kathleen urgently needed a uterine
evacuation, but hospital policy prohibited the evacuation because a
fetal heartbeat was still present. The next closest hospital was 80
miles away. The Catholic Church has a strong policy against
abortion of any kind. 118 Should the hospital be exempt from ordinary
medical standards requiring it to perform the evacuation? Again,
more details about the specific hospital’s practices may be needed to
fairly weigh autonomy considerations. The church may alter
hypothetical outcomes in exemption cases by changing how it holds
itself out to the public, and this is one strength of the exclusion
approach to institutions. 119 Yet barring additional information, it
seems that a Catholic hospital that houses the only emergency
department in an eighty mile radius is highly likely to be a public
116. Id. (“[Obst] held various positions within the Mormon church . . . given his long
career with the Church, Mr. Obst must have been aware of the severity of his misconduct.”).
117. Ginty, supra note 70.
118. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services, UCCSB (Nov. 17, 2009) http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-CatholicHealth-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf.
119. Under the balancing advocated in Parts II and III, supra, church hospitals are more
likely to enjoy the benefits of religious exemptions if they are more exclusive or private and less
public. This is ironic in one sense, since the whole reason why many churches operate hospitals
is that delineate medicine is one field of particular religious significance; the church’s
determination of religious priorities does not really match up with the exclusivity
determination advocated here. And if they are not granted exemptions when their beliefs are at
odds with secular society, they may simply leave the market altogether. Yet in another sense,
society’s hefty interest in guaranteeing safe healthcare to patients who rely on it may rival the
church group’s interest in abstaining from what it considers immoral behavior.
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institution. Given the reasonable assumption that the hospital
accepts public aid and serves a broad base of both religious and nonreligious customers, 120 justifications for an exemption are minimal. 121
The costs of the exemption are great. The individual has very little
control over her interactions with the group but is coerced by a
physical emergency to seek help from it. The fact that the individual
has very limited market alternatives exacerbates the element of
coercion in this interaction. The balancing test thus disfavors an
exemption here.
Suppose in another case that a woman sues a church-owned
insurance company for failing to pay for her elective abortion. 122 The
insurance company provides health insurance to employees of
organizations affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints. 123 The insurance company is a nonprofit organization distinct
from the church, but funded by the church. Given the church’s
exclusive behavior and the fact that it participates very little in the
public sphere, justifications for an exemption are high. The costs of
an exemption are more difficult to determine. Inquiry into how
much control a woman has or how “voluntary” abortion is tends to
be highly controversial. 124 This example thus highlights one of the
major shortcomings of balancing approaches in general: they
necessarily require some arbitrary and subjective discretion. It also
illustrates that some dynamics between groups and individuals simply
120. Past studies by MergerWatch have indicated that “[r]eligiously-sponsored hospitals
serve and employ people from a wide variety of faiths and—as this study has demonstrated—
rely heavily on public funding.” No Strings Attached: Public Funding of Religiously Sponsored
Hospitals in the United States, THE MERGERWATCH PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS (2002), available
at http://www.mergerwatch.org/storage/pdf-files/bp_no_strings.pdf.
121. Again, this seems ironic because abortion is a deeply religious issue and abortion
laws are peppered with religious exemptions. However the mere fact that institutional
exemptions have little justification in instances where a religious healthcare group is a
community’s sole provider does not mean that they are never justified. The hospital can
physically relocate to a different location or take greater care to not to situate itself as the only
healthcare provider in a remote area unless it is willing to provide all services required by
patients. Moreover, individual exemptions may help protect religious liberty for doctors and
other individuals within Catholic institutions.
122. Katherine A. White analyzes several such cases. Katherine A. White, Crisis of
Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1703 (1999).
123. See id. at 1741 (describing Deseret Mutual Benefits Association as such an
insurance company).
124. Daniel K. Williams, No Happy Medium: The Role of Americans’ Ambivalent View of
Fetal Rights in Political Conflict over Abortion Legalization, 25 J. POL’Y HIST. 42 (2013).
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cannot be captured by a catch-all theory of exemptions. Yet attempts
to measure institutional exclusivity and individual control may at
least help clarify some of the dynamics at play. Here, the individual
can probably find alternative abortion providers in the market and
pay them out-of-pocket if her insurance company denies coverage.
Also, she was probably well aware upon entering a relationship with
the religious employer and church-owned insurance organization
that abortion services would not be covered. Costs of an exemption
are probably low. The exemption is probably fair from a costsbenefits standpoint.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal controversy surrounding institutional religious exemptions,
exceptions for church-affiliated organizations from neutral and
generally applicable laws, is thriving. Supporters have argued that
institutional exemptions are crucial to safeguarding free exercise
rights for religious individuals. Critics have decried institutional
exemptions’ shielding of religious organizations from important civil
rights safeguards. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the
controversy; supporters and critics alike have found, at times, ample
justification for their respective positions. On one hand, institutional
exemptions can protect religious freedom by providing a vehicle for
free exercise and by advancing democratic goals of pluralism. On the
other, they threaten to subvert personal autonomy by insulating
church-affiliated institutions from laws designed to protect
individuals from abuses of group power.
One solution is a balancing test that weighs the benefits of
institutional exemptions, namely group autonomy, against the costs,
subversion of personal autonomy. Courts must evaluate religious
exclusivity, the degree to which an organization accepts state aid
and/or holds itself out as publicly accessibly, in order to objectively
measure an exemption’s potential free exercise benefits. They must
also consider voluntariness, or the degree to which an individual
interacting with a religious institution has access to information
and/or to market alternatives, in order to measure potential costs.
Costs and benefits of institutional exemptions are difficult to
measure and will vary widely in different contexts. And all balancing
tests are vulnerable to some abuse by judges. Yet objective
considerations of religious exclusivity and voluntariness can help
courts achieve more procedurally fair results. The balancing test
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outlined in this Comment helps resolve a core element of the
exemption dilemma. It articulates the conceptual framework by
which institutional exemptions should be analyzed. It introduces a
new way to measure the desirability of institutional exemptions
generally without substantively defining religion or deferring too
broadly to religious group power.
Leilani N. Fisher*

* J.D. Candidate, April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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